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Resumen
Este documento presenta un modelo monetario con rigideces nominales en el cual las firmas, a
diferencia del nuevo modelo Keynesiano, establecen políticas de fijación de precios en vez de fijar el
nivel de precios. En respuesta a shocks monetarios persistentes, el modelo es capaz de generar la lenta
(inercial) y prolongada (persistente) reacción de la inflación, y la caída en el producto que típicamente
se observan en los episodios de desinflaciones moderadas. La razón es que las firmas responden a este
shock principalmente a través de cambios en el componente de largo plazo de la inflación lo que, con
políticas de precios traslapadas, toma tiempo en ser reflejado en la inflación agregada.
Abstract
The paper proposes a monetary model with nominal rigidities that differs from the conventional New
Keynesian model in that firms set pricing policies instead of price levels. In response to permanent or
highly persistent monetary policy shocks this model generates the empirically observed slow (inertial)
and prolonged (persistent) reaction of the inflation rate, and also the recession which typically
accompanies moderate disinflations. The reason is that firms respond to such shocks mostly through a
change in the  long-run or inflation updating component of their pricing policies. With staggered
pricing policies this takes time to be reflected in aggregate inflation.
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A growing body of research in monetary theory uses the assumption of nominal
rigidities embedded in dynamic general equilibrium models with rational expectations.
Comprehensive surveys of this literature can be found in Gal· ı (2001) and Lane (2001).
The resurgence of this model class is based both on much improved theoretical foundations
and on empirical arguments. The time-dependent price adjustment formulations of
Taylor (1980), Rotemberg (1982) and Calvo (1983) made it possible to incorporate
nominal rigidities into rational expectations models with forward-looking optimizing agents.
Empirical support came from evidence showing that monetary policy has signiﬁcant short-
run real effects, such as Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996, 1998) and Leeper, Sims
and Zha (1996).
Many authors
1 argue that models with nominal rigidities can successfully account for
most of the effects of monetary policy. But whether these models can fully account for
all short-run empirical properties of inﬂation and output has recently been much debated.
Mankiw (2001) notes that they do not generate the empirically observed delayed and gradual
response of inﬂation to monetary policy shocks, a phenomenon that we will refer to as
inﬂation inertia. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) show that they also do not generate the observed
very prolonged steady state deviations of inﬂation following a monetary policy shock, a
phenomenon that is generally referred to as inﬂation persistence. In short, these are models
of stickiness in price levels, but they imply no stickiness in inﬂation. This in turn implies that
disinﬂationary policies have minimal real costs, or even that anticipated disinﬂations cause
booms (Ball, 1994a). This is also inconsistent with a large body of empirical evidence (see
e.g. Gordon 1982, 1997) which shows that disinﬂationary policies give rise to recessions,o r
more speciﬁcally to a U-shaped output response. These empirical regularities are typically
presented using VAR impulse responses such as the ones displayed in Figure 1 for the US
1 See Taylor (1998) and Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999).
1case, showing the response of the nominal interest rate, inﬂation and output to a one standard
deviation monetary policy shock.
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Figure 1 : VAR Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock
In this paper we use a tractable generalization of the Calvo (1983) staggered pricing
model ﬁrst introduced by Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2001, 2002). Our model contains the
conventional staggered pricing model as a special case. But it is also capable of generating
inﬂation inertia, inﬂation persistence and recessionary disinﬂations, and it does so without
relying on nominal wage rigidities or real supply side rigidities. Its main difference to
conventional treatments is in its speciﬁcation of ﬁrms’ price setting behavior. We suggest
that, in the realistic case of a positive steady state inﬂation rate, it ismore plausible to assume
that ﬁrms employ pricing policies instead of setting only a price level. The purpose of such
policiesistokeepthemascloseaspossibletotheirsteadilyincreasingﬂexiblepriceoptimum
between the times at which price changing opportunities arrive. To keep the model tractable,
we speciﬁcally assume that once a ﬁrm gets the chance to change its pricing policy, it jointly
2 This is a recursive VAR with quarterly data from 1960:2 through 2000:4. The ordering
and data are standard: Inﬂation (CPI growth rate), output (Hodrick-Prescott detrended real
per capita GDP) and the interest rate (Fed Funds rate). The results are very similar to Stock
and Watson (2001). The initial values shown for the interest rate and inﬂation are the sample averages.
2and optimally chooses an initial price level and an unconditional rate at which it will update
its price in the future, a ‘ﬁrm-speciﬁci n ﬂation rate’.
We motivate this speciﬁcation by appealing to costs of reoptimization, such as costs of
information gathering, decision making, negotiation and communication. The empirical
evidence presented by Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta and Bergen (2000) emphasizes the
importance of reoptimization costs relative to menu costs (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985), the
most common motivation for nominal rigidities. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001)
describe price setting behavior under reoptimization costs as follows: ‘...in the presence of
these costs ﬁrmsfullyoptimizepricesonlyperiodically, andfollowsimple rulesfor changing
their prices at other times.’ In the existing literature there are two dominant approaches to
specifying such a simple rule. In one (Woodford, 2002) ﬁrms choose only a price level
without updating. In the other (Yun, 1996) ﬁrms still choose only a price level but update
their prices at the steady state inﬂation rate at all times. But under both of these approaches
only the aggregate price level is sticky while inﬂation is ﬂexible. Credible disinﬂations
therefore do not cause recessions.
By contrast, when ﬁrms employ pricing policies of the kind we propose, an unexpected
and permanent decline in the steady state inﬂation rate targeted by monetary policy entails a
slow inﬂation response and output losses, even if the change in policy is perfectly credible.
There are two main reasons for this. The ﬁrst is the continuing effect of historic pricing
decisions. The economy initially contains a large number of ﬁrms that have chosen their
price updating rates under the previous policy, and the weighted average of such updating
rates is an important component of aggregate inﬂation. Intuitively, because it is costly for
ﬁrms to be continuously informed about monetary conditions, it takes time for their periodic
inﬂationary updating to fully reﬂect the stance of monetary policy on inﬂation. The second
reason for the slow inﬂation response is the behavior of new price setters. The spread
between ﬁrms’ initially chosen price and the aggregate price level, or ‘front loading’, is
the second component of aggregate inﬂation. Because ﬁrms have the option of updating
3their prices, front loading will respond very little to the policy change, contributing further
to the sluggishness of the inﬂation response. Finally, the real interest rate increase induced
by the slow inﬂation response gives rise to a recession.
The motivation forour pricing speciﬁcation
3 is similar to that of Mankiwand Reis (2002).
These authors present a model where price setters are assumed to be able to reset their
price every period, but receive information only at random intervals. This is equivalent to
assuming that ﬁrms choose a price path, and it generates predictions that qualitatively match
important features of the data. The drawback is that the model’s microeconomic foundations
are not fully laid out, which makes it harder to explore its quantitative predictions and their
sensitivity to the values of structural parameters.
4
The literature related to inﬂation inertia also encompasses models of backward-looking
behavior, imperfect credibility, learning and supply side rigidities. Until quite recently the
literature mostly relied on speciﬁcations that were not explicitly built on forward-looking
optimizing behavior. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) present a relative real wage model, while
Ghezzi (2001) and Clarida, Gal· ı and Gertler (1999) modify the Calvo (1983) model to allow
for a share of price setters to be backward looking, in the sense of using a rule of thumb
that depends on lagged inﬂation. A well-known explanation for inﬂation inertia during
disinﬂations is lack of credibility, see the papers by Ball (1995) and Calvo and Vegh (1993).
However, in many countries where disinﬂations were costly the monetary authority enjoyed
a high degree of credibility, as argued by Ball (1994b). This is therefore only a suitable
explanation for a limited number of cases. Models of learning about monetary policy have
recently become popular, and clearly such models do give rise to inﬂation inertia because
the contain an element of backward-looking behavior. Two examples are Woodford (2001)
3 See Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2001) for the original statement.
4 Burstein (2002) provides a general equilibrium model with microeconomic foundations
that is related to Mankiw and Reis (2002). However, it is a nonlinear model and complex to
solve. We will argue below that concentrating on linear pricing policies is both reasonable
and advantageous for quantitative model evaluation.
4and Erceg and Levin (2002). Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) generate inﬂation
and output inertia in a rational expectations model by introducing a number of nominal and
real supply side rigidities. Their most successful model variant does however still rely on a
backward-looking price and wage updating scheme.
The results of our paper will be presented as a comparison between our model and a
conventional model with an identical demand side. We will refer to the latter as the Calvo-
Yun model because we make the Yun (1996) assumption that ﬁrms update prices at the
steady state inﬂation rate. As the only difference between these models is their price setting
speciﬁcation, the main differences in their performance arise under nominal shocks. The
key point is that our model behaves very differently whenever aggregate inﬂation needs to
change from its current level for a long period of time, because only then do ﬁrms have an
incentive to change the long-run or inﬂation updating component of their pricing policies.
Themain exampleofsuch ashock is ahighly persistent monetary policy shock, speciﬁcally a
long-lasting change in the targeted inﬂation rate such as a disinﬂation. In that case our model
displays inﬂation inertia and persistence and a U-shaped output response. On the other hand,
under temporary monetary policy shocks the two models perform almost identically. This
is because ﬁrms’ response to the shock will then be mostly through their current price level,
just as in the Calvo-Yun model. Our approach is supported by the empirical evidence in
Rudebusch (2002), who ﬁnds that monetary policy shocks are indeed highly persistent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
compares the performance of the two models. Section 4 concludes.
2T H E M O D E L
The economy consists of a continuum of measure one of identical price-taking inﬁnitely-
lived households, a continuum indexed by j ∈ [0,1] of monopolistically competitive
inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrms, and a government.
52.1 Households
Households maximize lifetime utility, which depends on their per capita consumption
￿ ct,l e i s u r e1 − Lt (where 1 is the ﬁxed time endowment and Lt is total labor supply),
and real money balances Mt/Pt (where Mt is nominal money and Pt is the aggregate
price index). Households exhibit habit persistence with respect to ￿ ct, with habit parameter
ν.
5 Consumption ￿ ct is a CES aggregator over individual varieties ￿ ct(j), with elasticity of
substitutionσ>1. Wescaleconsumptioncandoutputy bythestateofaggregatetechnology
z, and write ct =￿ ct/zt,c t(j)=￿ ct(j)/zt,y t =￿ yt/zt,y t(j)=￿ yt(j)/zt. Total scaled




















where Pt(j) is the price of variety j. In addition to money households hold one period
nominal government bonds Bt with nominal return it. Their income consists of nominal
wage income WtLt, lump-sum proﬁt redistributions from ﬁrms
R 1
0 Πt(j)dj, and lump-






























Ct = ctzt − νct−1zt−1 ,
and where Et is the expectation conditional on information available at time t,a n dγ is the
5 Habit persistence is not essential for our main results: inﬂation inertia/persistence and recessionary
disinﬂations. Its only role is to produce more reasonable, U-shaped instead of V-shaped, output responses.
6intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Households’ budget constraint is
Bt =( 1+it−1)Bt−1 + Mt−1 − Mt + WtLt +
Z 1
0
Πt(j)dj + Ptτt − Ptctzt . (4)
We denote the multiplier of this budget constraint by Λt, and let λt = ΛtPt.T h e n t h e


























= λtwt , (7)






where wt = Wt/Pt. Because the central bank will be assumed to follow an interest rate
rule, the ﬁrst-order condition for money is redundant. It simply determines the quantity of
money required to meet the interest rate target, without affecting any other variables. We
proceed to linearize conditions (6) - (8) around the steady state. A hat above a variable
denotes its percent deviation from steady state, e.g. ￿ xt =( xt − ﬂ x)/ﬂ x,w h e r eﬂ x is the steady
state of xt. For interest and inﬂation rates it denotes the percent deviation of the gross rate













Et￿ ut+1 + βνEt ￿ Ct+1 =( 1− βν) ￿ λt , (9)
￿ λt −￿ ıt = Et
‡









￿ ut + Γ￿ Lt − ￿ λt , (11)
7where




(￿ ct +￿ zt) −
ν
1 − ν
(￿ ct−1 +￿ zt−1) . (13)
2.2 Firms
Each ﬁrm j ∈ [0,1] sells a distinct product variety. Heterogeneity in price setting
decisions and therefore in demand for individual products arises because each ﬁrm receives
its price changing opportunities at different, random points in time. Following Calvo (1983)
it is assumed that these opportunities follow a geometric distribution, so that the probability
(1 − δ) of a ﬁrm’s receiving a new opportunity is independent of how long ago it was last
able to change its price. It is also independent across ﬁrms, so that it is straightforward to
determine the aggregate distribution of prices.
We assume that ﬁrms’ unscaled output ￿ yt(j) is produced via linear production functions
in labor input lt(j):
￿ yt(j)=ztlt(j) , or yt(j)=lt(j) . (14)
To simplify notation we assume a steady state productivity growth rate of zero and a
steady state of ﬂ z =1 . We also assume the following law of motion for productivity:
￿ zt = ρ
z￿ zt−1 +￿ ε
z
t . (15)
Firms have market power and therefore set the prices of their varieties Pt(j) to maximize







In contrast to the Calvo-Yun pricing speciﬁcation, we assume that when a ﬁrm j gets an





t at which it will update its price from today onwards until the time it is next allowed
8to change its policy.









Firms discount nominal proﬁts expected in period t + k by the k-period ahead nominal
interest rate ik
t and by δ
k, the probability that their period t pricing policy will still be in
force k periods from t. The government is assumed to subsidize output at the rate φ to
eliminate the steady state markup distortion, following Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
Nominal revenue at t therefore equals Pt(j)yt(j)zt(1+φ). Labor markets are assumed to be


























































Note that the ﬁrm speciﬁc superscript j can be dropped because all ﬁrms that get a price
changing opportunity at time t will behave identically. We now deﬁne the following terms:
pt ≡ Vt/Pt (the front loading term), Πt,k ≡
Qk
j=1(1 + πt+j) for k ≥ 1 (≡ 1 for k =0 ). The
ﬁrst-order condition with respect to Vt is then
pt =
σ


























6 Weemphasizethat ourmodellingofnominal rigiditiesbuildsinlessad-hocbehaviorthanthe Calvo-Yun
model, because it imposes fewer exogenous constraints on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem.
7 As for the possibility of more general price paths, we would argue that it is natural to focus on
equilibria characterized by a constant steady state growth rate of the nominal anchor. The model can then be
solved by linearizing around that steady state, in which case it is sufﬁcient to allow ﬁrms
to specify their pricing policies up to the growth rate of their price path. This permits the
use of conventional solution methods, which makes quantitative analysis much more straightforward.
9and with respect to vt we have
pt =
σ


























We set φ =( σ − 1)−1 to eliminate the markup distortion, and therefore have ﬂ w =1 .
Before analyzing these conditions further we need to describe government policy and deﬁne
equilibrium.
2.3 Government
The government’s ﬁscal policy is assumed to be Ricardian. In particular, we assume that
the government budget is balanced period by period through lump-sum taxes/transfers, and




− φ ∗ ytzt , (21)




8 We assume that the central
bank pursues the following interest rate rule for its policy instrument it:
(1 + it)=β








(1 + ht) . (22)
The ﬁrst two components on the right-hand side equal the steady state gross nominal
interest rate. The inﬂation target ﬂ π is an integral part of the speciﬁcation of monetary
policy, and permanent monetary policy shocks will be modeled as permanent changes in
ﬂ π. The central bank interest rate response to expected deviations of inﬂation from its steady
state value has the response coefﬁcient ρ. The response coefﬁcient θ applies to the ratio of
technology-scaled aggregate output yt to its steady state value ﬂ y, or the output gap. In the
present model this is equivalent to a central bank concern with unemployment. Finally, ht is
8 The aggregate output index yt is deﬁned in the Appendix.
10a zero mean autocorrelated monetary policy shock
9 with law of motion
￿ ht = ρ
h￿ ht−1 + ε
h
t . (23)
The rule (22) can be linearized as
￿ ıt = ρEt￿ πt+1 + θ￿ yt + ￿ ht . (24)
Such forward-looking formulations of the policy rule are fairly common in theoretical
work, but in empirical work it is more common to assume one of two other formulations.
One is a backward-looking rule as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) or in Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2001). The other is a forward-looking rule in inﬂation and output
but adding a lag of the interest rate, also known as interest rate smoothing, as in Clarida,
Gal· ı and Gertler (1999). Our rule is closer to the latter but does not allow for interest rate
smoothing. We replace this with the assumption that monetary policy can be characterized
by persistent shocks ￿ ht. This is motivated by the work of Rudebusch (2002), who shows
that interest rate smoothing would imply a large amount of forecastable variation in interest
rates at horizons of more than three months, which is contradicted by evidence from the
term structure of interest rates. Highly persistent shocks are shown not to imply a large
forecastable variation.
A government policy is deﬁned as a set of stochastic processes {is,τs}
∞
s=t such that, given
stochastic processes {Ms,P s,y s,z s,h s}
∞
s=t, the conditions (21) and (22) hold for all s ≥ t.
2.4 Equilibrium
A list of stochastic processes {Bs,M s,c s,L s,y s,c s(j),l s(j),y s(j),j∈ [0,1]}
∞
s=t is an
allocation, with the relationships between cs and cs(j) and ys(j) and ls(j) given





s=t, with the relationship between Ps and Ps(j) given by
9 Such shocks, apart from capturing deliberate decisions to deviate temporarily and possibly
persistently froma systematic rule, may alsorepresent the effects on interest ratesofautocorrelatedinﬂation
forecast errors. We thank Charles Goodhart for emphasizing this point to us.
11(2) and the relationship between Ps(j), V j
s and vj
s g i v e nb y( 1 7 ) .Shock processes are a list
of stochastic processes {hs,z s}
∞
s=t. Then equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
An equilibrium given initial conditions h−1, z−1 and P−1 is an allocation, a price system,
a government policy and shock processes such that
(a) given the government policy, the price system and shock processes, the allocation
solves the household’s problem of maximizing (3) subject to (4),
(b) given the government policy, shock processes, the restrictions on price setting, and
the sequences {Ps,W s,c s}
∞




s=0 solve ﬁrms’ problem of
maximizing (18),
(c) the goods market clears for all goods and at all times, yt(j)=ct(j) ∀t,∀j ∈ [0,1],
(d) the labor market clears at all times, Lt =
R 1
0 lt(j)dj ∀t,
(e) the bond market clears at all times, Bt =0 ∀t.
The Appendix uses the deﬁnition of equilibrium to show that ﬂ L =ﬂ c =ﬂ y,w h e r eﬂ L is the
proportion of time spent working in steady state, and that
￿ Lt =￿ ct =￿ yt . (25)
In equilibrium the nominal interest rate used by ﬁrms to discount future proﬁts must
equal the nominal interest rate entering households’ budget constraint and therefore their
optimality condition (8). This implies that (1+ik
t)−1 = β
kEt(λt+k/(λtΠt,k)). Therefore we
have the following condition for ﬁrms’ steady state nominal discount factor: 1/(1 +ﬂ ık)=
(β/(1 + ﬂ π))
k. We are now ready to linearize ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-order conditions.
2.5 Linearized Price Dynamics
We linearize (19) for Vt and (20) for vt, quasi-difference them and combine them to
generate a difference equation for ￿ vt:
10




2 (￿ pt +￿ zt − ￿ wt) . (26)
10 A separate appendix with complete derivations of this and other results is available from
the authors upon request.
12We combine this with the aggregate price dynamics derived from the index (2). Given













Note that vt is deﬁned as the new ﬁrm-speciﬁci n ﬂation rate from t to t +1 . This differs
from the timing convention for the aggregate inﬂation rate from t to t +1 ,w h i c hi sπt+1.
This convention is adopted because, unlike πt+1, vt is known at t because the decision about








k￿ vt−1−k . (28)
We now deﬁne:




k￿ vt−1−k . (29)
This is, in deviation form, the weighted average of all those past ﬁrm-speciﬁci n ﬂation
rates that are still in force between periods t−1 and t, and which therefore enter into period
t aggregate inﬂation. Note that vt itself does not enter, because while it is determined at
t, it only starts to enter into aggregate inﬂation between t and t +1 .T h e v a r i a b l e￿ ψt is
predetermined and follows the difference equation
￿ ψt = δ￿ ψt−1 +( 1− δ)￿ vt−1 . (30)




￿ pt + ￿ ψt . (31)
This is a key equation, because its two components reﬂe c tt h et w om a i ns o u r c e so f
inﬂation inertia. Following a monetary policy shock, the continuing effects of price updating
decisions made under the old monetary policy are represented by ￿ ψt, and this is the main
source of inertia in aggregate inﬂation. In addition, if a monetary policy shock is very
persistent then new price setters respond mainly through changes in their updating rates.
13In that case front-loading ￿ pt responds very little, thereby generating further inertia. Equation































and to obtain the following differential equation for ￿ πt:
Et￿ πt+1 =
￿
























To summarize, the dynamic behavior of the economy can be characterized by the
aggregate demand block (9)-(13) and (25), the aggregate supply block (30), (32) and (33),
the monetary policy rule (24), and the exogenous shock processes (15) and (23).
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2.6 The Calvo-Yun Model
The aggregate demand block, monetary policy and shock processes of the Calvo-Yun
model are identical to the above. The aggregate supply block is replaced by the New
Keynesian Phillips curve:
βEt￿ πt+1 =￿ πt − Θ￿ wt + Θ￿ zt , (34)
where Θ =( 1− δ)(1 − δβ)/δ.
11 We have established numerically that this system has a unique rational expectations solution for
ρ>1 but that it exhibits multiplicity for ρ<1. For the current speciﬁcation of preferences
and technologies, the stability properties of our model are therefore the same as those of the
conventional New Keynesian system. Namely, an aggressive Taylor rule (ρ>1)g i v e sr i s e
to a unique solution while a passive rule (ρ<1) gives rise to multiplicity.
143M A C R O E C O N O M I C D Y N A M I C S
We calibrate parameter values for the quarterly frequency. The assumed value for the
degree of price stickiness δ =0 .75 implies an average contract length of four quarters,
which is consistent with the empirical evidence (Taylor, 1998).
12 The intertemporal elasticity
of substitution γ is assumed to equal 0.5.
13 The proportion of time spent working in steady
state ﬂ L =1 /3 is based on the evidence cited in Kydland (1995). The value for the habit
parameter ν =0 .7 follows Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001). We follow the literature
in assuming β =0 .99. Our parameter choices for the monetary policy rule are ρ =1 .5 and
θ =0 .6. This is within the range of parameter estimates reported by Rudebusch (2002) for
forward-lookingruleswithoutinterestratesmoothing. Asfortheshockprocesses, wechoose
a high persistence ρz =0 .95 for the technology shock, which is a common assumption in the
real business cycle literature, see Cooley and Prescott (1995). The parameter ρh determines
the persistence of monetary policy shocks. Because this is a key factor in our model, we will
explore the sensitivity of our results to various values of ρh.
We solve the model by the algorithm of King and Watson (1997), and use impulse
responsesto displaythedynamicresponseoftheeconomytothreeshocks. Ourmain concern
is with two kinds of monetary policy shocks, a permanent change in the targeted steady state
inﬂation rate ﬂ π and non-permanent shocks ￿ ε
h
t.W ea l s ob r i e ﬂy discuss technology shocks ￿ ε
z
t.
In allﬁgures thesolid lines represent theresults of ourmodelwhile thebroken lines represent
those of the Calvo-Yun model. The exception is the panel for νt and ψt, which is of course
only relevant for our model. For ease of presentation output and labor are normalized to one.
The ﬁrst monetary policy shock we consider is a permanent change in ﬂ π from 10% to
3% per annum. This is close in magnitude to the Volcker disinﬂation episode, a classical
12 Note however that the interpretation of the empirical evidence is different under the assumptions of
ourmodel. Thisisbecause weassumethat many observedpricechangesarenot associatedwithanupdating
of information about aggregate shocks. This would require a larger δ, which would give rise
to additional inﬂation inertia and persistence. We nevertheless assume δ =0 .75 for both models.
13 See e.g. Hansen and Singleton (1996).
15example of the kind of recessionary disinﬂation whose explanation is part of the motivation
of this paper.
The impulse responses in Figure 2 reveal the shortcomings of the conventional staggered
pricing model mentioned in the Introduction. Because ﬁrms are assumed to immediately
start updating their prices at the new steady state inﬂation rate, inﬂation instantaneously
drops to its new target level. It is therefore neither inertial nor persistent. And because the
ex-ante real interest rate never changes, consumption, output and employment remain ﬂat,
i.e. disinﬂations are not recessionary.
In our model inﬂation exhibits both a very gradual initial response, inertia, and a very
prolonged deviation from its (new) steady state, persistence. This is ﬁrst because of the
continuing effect of pricing decisions taken under the old, higher inﬂation monetary regime,
and second because front-loading responds very little. The latter is due to the fact that
monetary policy has changed permanently, so that price setters prefer to respond through
the long-run or updating component of their pricing policies. The inﬂation deviation from
steady state and the high response coefﬁcient ρ to such deviations in the monetary policy rule
imply that nominal interest rates initially stay very high, and more importantly that there is
a steep rise in the real interest rate. This causes consumption, output and therefore labor
demand to drop, i.e. we observe the recession that is associated with disinﬂations in the data.
This in turn lowers the real wage, which exerts downward pressure on prices so that inﬂation
begins to fall. At the same time the recession induces lower nominal interest rates through
the monetary policy rule. The combination of these two effects starts to lower real interest
rates, and once this process is complete the recession ends and inﬂation drops to its new
target. An output sacriﬁce is therefore unavoidable in bringing down inﬂation.
The key ingredient required to obtain this result is that following the shock aggregate
inﬂation is expected to be much lower than its initial value for a long period of time. In
that case ﬁrms have an incentive to change the long-run component of their pricing policies,
thereby delaying the instantaneous response of inﬂation. This reason for inertia is different
16from the one that is commonly stressed in the literature, which relies on a slow response of
marginal cost to shocks. In our model inﬂation is inertial and persistent despite the fact that
marginal cost (the real wage) is perfectly ﬂexible.
The importance of a prolonged expected change in aggregate inﬂation suggests that the
effect of a highly persistent monetary policy shock should be almost identical to that of a
permanent shock. In our second monetary policy experiment we therefore assume that the
steady state inﬂation rate remains at 10% per annum but that ρh =0 .99. Figure 3 shows that
for our model the economy indeed responds almost exactly like in the previous case. But
the Calvo-Yun model now performs very differently, exhibiting not only prolonged inﬂation
but also output deviations from steady state. This discontinuity arises because the presence
of a discounting factor in the New Keynesian Phillips curve (34) makes the model behave
very differently depending on whether there are persistent inﬂation deviations from steady
state or whether the steady state itself has changed. This unappealing feature follows directly
from the rigidity of the updating assumption in that model, and is therefore not shared by our
model. Furthermore, the Calvo-Yun model implies neither an inertial response of inﬂation
nor a U-shaped output response.
Figure 4 studies the degrees of inﬂation inertia generated by the two models in more
detail. It uses the ratio of the impact jump in inﬂation to the size of the monetary policy
shock as a proxy for the inertia or slowness of the inﬂation response to monetary policy
shocks, with a smaller ratio corresponding to more inertia. The ﬁgure shows how this ratio
changes with increasing degrees of monetary policy shock persistence ρh.W es e et h a tf o r
ρh above 0.85 inﬂation is far more inertial, or far less ‘jumpy’, in our model. Inertia in fact
starts to increase as ρh → 1. For lower degrees of shock persistence inertia is very similar
between the two models. To understand this, we now brieﬂy turn to Figure 5, which displays
impulse responses to a more transitory monetary policy shock, with ρh =0 .7. Because
in this case the expected change in aggregate inﬂation is of a short duration, price setters
react mostly through the short-term or front-loading component of their pricing policies. As
17a result pricing is almost identical for the two models. Therefore the real effects are also
very similar. We observe a recession that is both more shallow and shorter than for a highly
persistent shock of equal impact size.
Finally, in Figure 6 we study the effects of a one percent increase in zt,t h el e v e lo f
technology or productivity. With ρz =0 .95 productivity thereafter takes some time to
return to its steady state level. The real effects are dominated by the productivity shock
itself and they therefore differ little between the two models. The increase in productivity
results in both an increase in unscaled output ytzt (and consumption ctzt) and a decrease in
labor demand. But despite the latter the real wage rises by over 1%. This is because the
monetary policy response to unemployment, or equivalently to a negative output gap, is a
lower nominal and therefore real interest rate, which reduces the marginal utility of wealth
by more than the marginal utility of leisure, see (7). Aggregate inﬂation stays very close
to 10% throughout, so inﬂation inertia plays almost no role. As a result the two models
perform almost identically. This illustrates the fact that the main differences in the two
models’ performance arise under nominal shocks, because they only differ in their price
setting speciﬁcations.
4C O N C L U S I O N
This paper presents a monetary model with nominal rigidities and maximizing, rational,
forward-looking households and ﬁrms. It differs from conventional models in this class in
one key respect - ﬁrms set pricing policies instead of price levels. The paper is motivated
by some important shortcomings of conventional models, namely their inability to generate
inﬂation inertia, inﬂation persistence and recessionary disinﬂations.
The model does generate all of these effects in response to highly persistent monetary
policy shocks such as permanent changes in the targeted inﬂation rate. The channel for these
effectsinthemodelisthelong-runorinﬂationupdatingcomponentof ﬁrms’pricingpolicies.
18This is distinct from another frequently stressed reason for inﬂation inertia and persistence,
a slow response of marginal cost to shocks. Because that channel is still important when
shocks are less persistent, we will in future work study the role of staggered wage setting
policies i n addition to stagge red pric ing policies.
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Figure 2 : Permanent Disinﬂation
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Figure 3 : Highly Persistent Monetary Policy Shock ρh =0 .99












































Figure 4 : Inﬂation Inertia as a Function of ρh
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Figure 5 : Transitory Monetary Policy Shock ρh =0 .7
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Figure 6 : Technology Shock
22Appendix A. Consumption - Labor Supply Relationship










From the deﬁnition of equilibrium we know that yt(j)=ct(j) and therefore yt = ct.















lt(j)dj = Lt , (A.3)









Then we can derive the following relationship from (A.1) - (A.4):











This implies that the steady state relationship between labor supply, consumption and
output is
ﬂ L =ﬂ c =ﬂ y. (A.6)
Furthermore, (A.5) can be linearized as
￿ Lt =￿ ct =￿ yt . (A.7)
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